This paper is devoted to recovery and residual value risks modeling issues of automotive lease portfolios. First, loss given default distributions are estimated and compared for different samples based on risk drivers. Secondly, residual value risk is approached through a re-sampling technique to provide the first empirical residual value losses in the automotive lease sector. Probability density function of losses and VaR measures are estimated on the basis of a private database comprising a unique set of 4,828 individual automotive lease contracts issued between 1990 and 2001 by a major European financial institution. Then, a discussion is led in relation to the capital requirements related to residual value risk stemming from the Basel Committee's proposed new framework (as in CP3). As the greatest part of recovery risk is diversifiable, our conclusion is that a wider recognition of physical collateral under Basel II should allow to better reflecting the relatively low-risk profile of automotive lease exposures.
Introduction
Little research has been carried out on the risk of retail lease portfolios although the volume of new business in the lease-financing sector rose to more than C =199 billion according to Leaseurope's 2002 estimates, i.e. the penetration rate of equipment lease in comparison with total equipment investments reached 15%. Indeed the studies are driven by the construction of databases comprising proprietary data that allow us to run effective risk models. In fact, retail markets present a number of challenges for credit risk estimations (see Allen, Delong and Saunders [1] ) since retail portfolios are illiquid and are not traded in secondary markets; furthermore, borrowers tend to be informationally opaque and borrow infrequently.
Four empirical studies have recently been conducted to assess credit risk in the leasing business. Though based on a relatively small amount of data, De Laurentis and Geranio [9] provide useful empirical and quantitative information, suggesting, in particular, that the European leasing industry benefits from high recovery rates in the event of default. Working with a much larger sample of individual defaulted lease contracts issued between 1976 and 2002 by 12 companies in six different countries, Schmit and Stuyck [20] extended the investigation to include an analysis of recovery rates relative to the age, term-to-maturity, and default date of each contract. Their study confirmed De Laurentis and Geranio's earlier finding that leasing companies incur relatively low losses when a lease defaults. A later study by Schmit [18] estimates the probability density function of losses and VaR measures in a portfolio of vehicle leases issued between 1990 and 2000 by a major European financial institution. The estimates are carried out on a model based on CreditRisk+TM (Credit Suisse Financial Product [8] ). The results of the first study are confirmed by the second, which -applying a non-parametric simulation -extends the scope of the investigation. In fact, in addition to the above-mentioned automotive lease contracts, the proprietary database used for the second study includes leases for office equipment/computers, medical equipment and other kinds of equipment. Sub-portfolio losses for each type of asset are then estimated with a re-sampling or bootstrap technique similar to the one used by Carey [5] to estimate credit losses in private debt portfolios. The results of these two latest studies suggest that the capital requirements prescribed under the current Basel Committee's [2] proposed new framework (as in CP3) are excessive for automotive lease business.
This paper goes beyond credit risk to focus specifically on recovery risk and the role of physical collateral in lease portfolio. Even though it is a common feature, little effort has been empirically devoted to the issue. Indeed, we propose to assess the value of physical collateral on a given automotive lease portfolios representative of its market. Results are provided for several subsamples, based on the financial remaining duration (which comes out to be particularly useful and trustworthy, as opposed to calendar duration) and different states of the economy in order to assess whether recovery risk is diversifiable or not. As an extension, we calculate the distribution of losses incurred on automotive lease portfolio associated with residual value risk i.e. loss experience when the realized value of a lease asset at its maturity is less than the option price defined at the beginning of the lease. This is particularly useful in respect to the discussion led in relation to the capital requirements related to residual value risk stemming from CP3.
The next section describes the data, proposes some computations of key risk variables while a perspective on the stratification of the data across is presented. This will be of main importance when determining which drivers will be cross-checked against our loss and recovery risk estimations. Section 3 outlines our methodology to estimate recovery risk in addition to explaining the re-sampling technique used for the calculation of loss distribution tails. Section 4 provides empirical results and discuss them against some regulatory implications. Finally, a conclusion is drawn.
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The Data
Lease definition encompasses various types of contracts. In the current research, lease contracts are mainly non-cancellable and lessees are responsible for the selection, acquisition and maintenance of the asset. At maturity, the residual value of the leased asset returns to the lessor but the lessee has usually the right to buy it for a contractual residual value.
Our database consists of a unique set of 4,828 individual defaulted auto lease contracts issued between 1990 and 2001 by a major European leasing company with an over 20% share of its national market. All leases are completed contracts.
The database contains all the relevant information concerning the leases throughout their life. The available variables fall into two categories: ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante variables are the origination date of the contract, the cost of the asset, the contractual maturity of the lease, the periodicity of forecasted payments and the asset description. As regards ex-post variables, we have comprehensive data concerning the date of the default declaration, the total amount already invoiced but not honoured (called "total overdue", an annuity including accrued interests and a fraction of the principal amount), the amount of outstanding capital remaining after the last defaulted invoiced amount, the amount recovered and its effective date thanks to the asset sale (free of additional executed guarantees), the charged-off date (date of final accounting loss recognition), the procedure length (in general, calendar time between charged-off and default dates, the yearly yield of the contract alive (may be used as an opportunity cost).
Given the previous definitions, it must be noted that at the default date, the total amount due by the counterpart is the sum of the "outstanding capital" and the "total overdue", such that Total due = Capital Outstanding + Total overdue (1) Figure 1 presents the relationship between the principal and interest components of annuity payments and these observed variables. Table 1 provides a sampling of the database by the issuance year 1 and by the original contractual duration (in months) of the defaulted lease contracts. It follows from it that most of the contracts have a contractual length of four to six years while their allocation throughout years of inception seems to be quite regular with a number of observations that allows us to segment the data further. Table 2 presents a stratification that makes now emphasis on the effective maturity, i.e. focusing on the year of default. Given that the default term will be a key variable for our analysis, it is important to note that years 1990 to 1992 offer little Would the loss-at-default be influenced by the age of the contract, an analysis made only on those years will undoubtedly bring the conclusion that "earlier years offer only short defaults" and bias therefore our study of the behavior of the loss-at-default.
Descriptive statistics
One of the key points of the present study is the analysis of the realized payoff at default, in terms of exposure-at-default (EAD) as well as the effective age of the contract at that time. In the present database, the default date is recorded when the effective final default happens. In particular, the final default may occur later than the contractual maturity in cases where renegotiation took place. This occurs for 217 contracts of our database, as shown in table 3 together with other specificities: recoveries that are higher than the initial investment (14 cases) and default happening on the inception date (1 case only).
First computations: measuring time-to-default & losses
As mentioned earlier, the default date may be influenced by the existence of renegotiation schemes. A reasonable alternative to the use of the "months-to-default" variable would consist in computing the financial residual duration of the defaulted lease contracts as the fraction of the remaining total amount due over the original investment conceeded by the lessor.
It should be noted that the total amount due may be higher than the original investment or cost of the lease. This may happen because of the integratation of Table 1 : Contractual maturity stratification of the data. Number of observations by contract duration (interval in months) and by the year of inception of the lease).
unpaid accrued interest fractions of annuities (see figure 1 ; the dashed zone might be higher than the principal amount depicted by the leftmost triangle). Table 4 presents the overall distribution of our database accross the so-called "financial duration" (F dur) and the year of inception. The data appears to be regularly distributed on four equal intervals between 0% and 100% of the original investment. Evidence is provided on 173 contracts that supersedes the 100% value.
Losses 3 are computed as the total amount due minus the recovered value of the asset being sold at default for contract i, i.e.
LGD i = total amount due − recovered value.
LGD i takes therefore positive values for losses and negative values for net gains to the lessor. As mentioned earlier, the total amount due does not integrate any other amounts than the unpaid portion of the principal amount of the lease (including the residual value) plus unpaid accrued interest. Moreover, the recovered amount is a pure marked-to-market value as it comprises only the realized value of the leased asset sold at the final default date.
However, this version of the LGD does not take the opportunity cost of the recovery delay into account. The recovery delay is defined as the number of months between the default date and the recovery date. As it can be seen in figure 3 in the appendix, a majority of the contracts shows a delay of around 2 years when excluding contracts with renegotiation schemes. We therefore computed a second version of the LGD, where the total due amount is restated to include this opportunity cost, as total amount due * = total amount due (1 + yield%)
LGD
where d is the recovery delay in months and yield% is the yearly yield information (in percent) of every contract used as the opportunity cost base. We decided therefore to undertake the study with both calculations since it would allow us to show the impact of the recovery delay on our estimates 4 . The recovery delay may account for the liquidity risk and other operational issues to which the asset liquidation procedure is subject. Table 5 shows that, while the majority of defaulted contracts experience a loss, more than 25% of them generate a net gain for the lessor upon the sale of the asset.
Start Interval (F dur) year 0-25% 25%-50% 50%-75% 75%-100% Over Total  1990  70  107  156  109  17  459  1991  62  88  120  107  19  396  1992  60  97  126  120  28  431  1993  53  87  119  132  34  425  1994  83  70  111  86  8  358  1995  67  77  114  75  8  341  1996  75  78  79  62  4  298  1997  80  83  93  53  5 Table 4 : Effective financial duration. Fraction of the accomplished financial duration up to the default time, by year of inception. Financial duration = (total amount due/original investment).
LGD relative to the due amount
We also need the expression of the average LGD relative to the total amount due for a given portfolio. This is 5 LGD%
total amount due i (6) = average portfolio loss average portfolio due value ,
and is valid for both versions of LGD provided that the total amount due is consistent with the LGD version chosen:
3 The Methodology
Loss given default
Starting from the overall database and after verifying for the consistency of the records considered, various sampling criteria were retained according to the empirical 5 Even though this expression is straightforward, computing instead the average of LGD % i per contract i would result in values and a meaning that may be far from our objective. Since the leasing company will focus on overall losses on a given portfolio rather that its ability to have the lowest loss per contract, we will make use of equation 6 which is equivalent to compute a weighted average of the loss rate per contract LGD % i . Table 5 : Loss distribution. Number of positive, null and negative losses. Negative values are equivalent to a net gain for the lessor upon the sale of the asset serving as collateral.
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evidence of the past section:
• All contracts vs. contracts characterized by F dur ∈ [0%, 40%] or by F dur ∈ [60%, ∞ [.
• All contracts vs. contracts defaulted in bad years or in good years 6 .Three samples will be considered 7 : observations of all years taken together, observations of years 1993 and 2001 (considered as the bad years) and observations from 1997 and 1998 (considered as the good years) 8 . Those three samples will be generated on the basis of the year of default 9 of each contract. Since we want to focus on just the payoff at default and its market risk component 10 , we precisely need to estimate the weight of systematic risk in the residual value of the lease 11 .
Two sets of criteria generate six different samples for the study of the empirical LGD% pf distribution. 6 It must be reminded that table 2 shows that earlier years present a limited data stratification that points them out automatically as having rapidly defaulted. Therefore, data belonging to the period 1990-1992 was dropped out. Any further study sampled on the basis of this ranking would therefore need to consider only years from 1993 onwards. 7 These years or annual periods were determined based on the results presented by Linna [13] and a discussion by Cooper [7] on the paper of Bergman, Bordo and Jonung [3] . An examination of Belgian stock index series was also performed. 8 By choosing only 1998 as the good year, we ensure the compatibility of the samples accross the LGD measures. 9 In opposition to the inception date of the contract. Using the latter would implicitely mean somehow that a contract LGD would be hopelessly predictable based on the state of economy at origination regardless of the time-to-default. Such a world would be scaring. 10 i.e., the asset liquidation at a marked-to-market price. 11 The New Basel Accord requires frequent analysis to be conducted ex-post on past data, the information on default dates is an observable variable.
Additional cases are also considered to study the impact of negative losses (i.e. net gains for the lessor: LGD < 0) and the implications of the renegotiations operated on some contracts (months-to-default > contract duration).
A bootstrapping methodology will allow us to recover a consistent distribution of LGD% pf from our empirical samples, by iteratively and randomly choosing portfolios of contracts. The generated distributions should reflect the properties of the true distribution of losses.
Residual value risk
Originally, the residual value risk "is the bank's exposure to potential loss due to the fair value of the asset declining below its residual estimate at lease inception" (see [2] ). This residual estimate is contractually defined such that the lessee may keep the asset at the end of the contract in exchange of its payment, which represents the strike price of an option that the lessee may or may not exercise. Given that this residual value is fixed ex-ante, there is no uncertainty about its amount. The only remaining uncertainty is the liquidation value of the collateral asset. Additionally, one of the main characteristics of the leasing practices on the national market on which the database is provided is that the option value represents only a tiny fraction of the original investment 12 .
The difficulty in obtaining consistent estimations of collateral market values for non-defaulted contracts is here encompassed by observing effective losses on defaulted contracts that are close to maturity. In this context, we argue that the distribution of LGDs would allow us to infer the residual value risk of lease contracts. This makes the implicit assumption that if the recovered value is enough to cover the small fraction of total amount still due, then we are left with the rest to cover the residual value. That is why we will focus on defaulted contracts that are close to their contractual maturity. The overall sample of LGDs will act as a proxy for the residual value risk for (a) contracts that are completely honoured but where the option is not exercised by the lessee and (b) for defaulted contracts 13 .
A bootstrapping framework
In the present sample, the loss rate distribution of a sub-portfolio is estimated by a resampling method called "bootstrap". Bootstrap is a powerful econometric technique that allows to approach the true distribution by making equiprobable draws with replacement from an observed sample of data. The advantage of this method is that it is non-parametric and relies only on observed data. We will perform here the same application of this technique as in Carey [5] . The basic process consists of choosing randomly, with replacement, a portfolio of n lease contracts for a randomly chosen year. The draw of a year can be interpreted as a draw from the best available representation of the possible macroeconomic conditions influencing the risk factor. The assumption is that each year has the same probability of being drawn (e.g. if we have 6 observation years, each year has a 1/6 probability of being drawn). The process is iterated i times. When a lease is drawn, then the associated loss is the difference between the due amount and the recovered value.
LGD can be either negative or positive. In the latter case, the recovery rate is higher than 100%. A single iteration of the procedure yields a loss rate for a given state of the economy (or a given year). Using a large number of iterations enables us to obtain a probability distribution of loss rates as a percentage of the total amount due. In our case, we ran the simulation procedure for portfolios consisting of 100, 400, 1600 and 6400 lease contracts by carrying out 100,000 iterations. By performing the draw procedure in two stages (i.e. drawing first a year and then a portfolio of n leases), we avoid the understating of tail loss rates. Otherwise, the combination of default experiences from different years would lead to a tricky mixture of the underlying systematic factors and hence to over-diversification 14 . We assume that the portfolio has a high degree of granularity, so that no single lease represents more than a small fraction of our portfolio 15 .
The Results
Loss given default
Losses-given-default (LGD% pf ) have been tested against several factors: the belonging to any of the bad or good years (as defined in subsection 3.1), portfolio diversification (represented by the portfolio size variable), and the importance of the payments not honoured compared to the initial invested amount (F dur). Table 6 shows that, median values for good years are better than those for the bad years. But, differences in this direction vanish when considering higher percentiles. Moreover, there seems to be an anticyclality effect in the extreme values of the distribution. That might be explained by the the fact that more people turn towards the automotive secondary market in bad business cycles and/or that the composition of the automotive portfolio changes 16 . But the reasons linked to the market of the asset collateral will be clarified when considering samples with contracts that are close to maturity since, then, we will be facing LGDs whose bigger component is the recovery part (see the results in table 7). This is indeed part of our motivation in examining the results based on residual values since we attempt there to concentrate on the market risk component (see subsection 4.2).
We need to mitigate somehow our comment on median values by the fact that standard deviations seem to shed light on a lower diversification in the original data for smaller samples 17 . However, as far as we are concerned with conservative requirements and therefore high percentiles, the extreme values of the bad years' distribution do not show any loss far beyond those of the overall sample nor for the good subsample. The higher kurtosis for the bad years' sample express the fact that there is more power in the tails of the distribution for that subsample which confirms the need to look at high percentiles for capital requirements. Also, the positive skewness of the overall sample contradicts the negative one of the subsamples which advocates for a higher potential of gains in the subsamples. Table 6: LGD% pf results by LGD cycles. Bootstrap statistics for three samples based on different years given their ranking in terms of best to worst average LGD (not in terms of probability of default like other studies). The best year is 1998 while the worst ones are 1993 and 2001. These two samples are compared to the overall one to check for cycle effects. The size of the portfolio is the number of contracts bootstrapped for each bootstrapped year.
Focusing now on the financial remaining duration and according to the results shown in table 7, the more contracts the portfolio contains, the less LGD distributions deviate from the mean loss. Moreover, in the case of "old" contracts (F dur < 40%) 18 , the 99.9 percentile is negative for portfolios of 1600 and 6400 contracts while it is pos-itive for smaller portfolios. The portfolio diversification effect is thus well established for credit risk in the automotive leasing business. This confirms the importance of the granularity and the "low value of individual exposures" criteria retained in the regulatory capital framework of the New Basel Capital Accord (see [2] , §44). Table 7 :
LGD results by F dur. Bootstrap statistics for three samples based on different intervals of financial duration. The financial duration is computed as the ratio of the total due at default over the initial investment. The size of the portfolio is the number of contracts bootstrapped for each bootstrapped year. This table is based on the original sample of 4,828 observations. Table 7 also presents important results concerning the F dur variable: 99,9% of the generated portfolios present a maximum LGD higher in the case where F dur is more than 60% than in the general case (35.22% vs. 27.78%, for LGD% pf ). More importantly, LGDs are negative for well diversified portfolios including contracts whose F dur is less than 40%. That makes the maximum LGD of 99,9% of these portfolios much smaller than that of 99,9% of all portfolios taken together.
This evidence can be explained by the linear timely reduction in the total amount due and the recovered value crossing the latter at ∼ 2/3 of the contract completion as illustrated in figure 2 . Therefore, contracts with a low remaining duration are undoubtedly contracts that present a much smaller credit risk component, getting closer to their residual value which is contractually fixed. Would the lessees default on this value or neither default nor exercise their option, figure 2.shows that the problem has shifted to one of market risk. This provides a visual motivation to study more precisely LGDs on "old" contracts (in F dur terms) as proxies for net residual values. Figure 2: The figure plots the average total due and the average recovered value as fractions of the original investment, against the percent of financial completion of the contract (F dur) defined as the ratio of the total due over the investment level.
The same conclusions apply to LGD% * pf . Indeed, relationships between subsamples are exacerbated. For the time being, any discrimination by a F dur interval has however not yet been considered in the regulatory capital requirements framework.
Special cases
In this section, we will focus on the influence of negative LGD of several contracts (i.e. gains resulted from a higher recovered value than the total due amount) and the impact of potential renegotiations (contracts whose contract duration is shorter than months-to-default period can be considered as renegociated contracts) on LGD distributions. By withdrawing these special contracts from the samples, the newly obtained LGD distributions emphasize the huge beneficial influence of positive LGD and the small positive impact of renegotiation capacity.
Indeed, 50% of the portfolios with positive LGD present a maximum LGD (29,55%) much higher than the maximum LGD (17,37%) of half all contracts together. Secondly, the maximum LGD of half all contracts together is slightly smaller (17,37%) than the maximum LGD of 50% of non renegotiable contracts (18,13% 
Residual value losses
We approximated residual value risk by using a sample of all contracts whose F dur is less than 20% and that default, i.e. we forego contracts where the option is exercised at the end of the contract. Therefore, we overestimate the resulting average effective residual value (conservative behavior). Table 9 presents values consistent with previous results on the sampling based on a low F dur (see table 7 ). Indeed, residual values are completely characterized by net gains, which means that we have demonstrated that residual value risk is inexistent in our database irrespectively of the year of default (at all percentile levels). Thus, taking into account "exercised-option" cases would lead us to the same statement as they have a null residual value.
Moreover, and consistently with our previous comment on the specific behavior of low "financial duration" contracts., we obtain now a clear cyclical effect in portfolios made of those contract. Indeed, the 99.9 th percentile for the bad years' sample shows a lower gain than that for the good years' sample. Typically, for contracts where the total amount due is close to the residual option value of the lease, the asset collateral represents almost a pure market risk exposure and, depending on the state of the secondary automotive market, may generate a strong positive earning to the lessor. Results on the LGD% * pf panel present the same pattern. Thus, focusing on short time-to-maturities (in financial terms), we shifted from a small anticyclical evidence on losses to a cyclical evidence on gains. But the latter are based now on LGDs whose "total amount due" component represents only a tiny residual credit risk exposure, the market value of the asset collateral more than compensating it in all cases.
Therefore, while any drawn conclusion on the role of business cycles would be difficult to objectively implement in a regulatory framework 19 , F dur stands as an objective driver that intrinsically represents the engineering framework of the lease industry: combining contracts with diverging amortization schemes to increase diversification and to enable a continuous revolving of lent amounts. Table 9 : Residual values distributions. Bootstrap statistics on residual values estimated with contracts which Fdur is lower than 20number of contracts bootstrapped for each bootstrapped year. Observations of obtained samples are provided in parentheses.
Conclusion
First, the present study proposes a systematic bootstrap methodology which, in the case of a retail automotive leasing portfolio, has allowed us to verify the relevance of some key drivers in the analysis of the LGD. The stratification of the data in terms of aging of the contracts is central to the obtained distribution of LGD. The present study has shown that comparing samples without taking this into consideration could substantially bias our conclusion. Moreover, the nature of credit risk and the ability of the physical collateral to substitute a market risk to the original credit risk exposure is strongly dependent on the remaining financial duration of the contract.
tial purposes, regulatory authorities are always reluctant to free up limits based on the anticipation of "better" years.
Indeed, that is the reason that led us to use those LGDs as proxies for the residual value risk. Therefore, such a result would advocate for a thinner segmentation of the risk weighting than as it is proposed under the New Basle Accord [2] . The current consultative document proposes a unique weighting of 75% in the standardized approach if sufficient conditions are met (see [2] , § § 43 & 44). Otherwise, the ratio is 100%. This methodology may help managers in switching to a more advanced approach and to screen their activity log to extract its stratification map. Secondly, studying
LGDs has led us to conclude that we can anticipate substantially lower losses towards the end of the contract, as measured in fraction of the original investment still current (F dur). The advantage of this measure as opposed to one based on calendar date differences between the inception date and the default date, is that it is a pure financial measure that is independent from the contractual date specificities of each sample. Moreover, using F dur provides a natural cash-flow weighting of the times-to-default.
Third, using only contracts that are close to their completion, and based on the previous results, we drew conclusions on the residual value risk. Results show that this exposure net of the recovered value is finally profitable for the lessor, which would mean that the lessor is better off in cases where the lessee does not exercise her option. Again, this is inherent to the fact that "old" contracts are contracts with low exposures left. This advocates for a treatment of the problem in one single block, without a separation of the credit and market risk exposures since there are intrinsically linked.
Extensions to the present research would include:
• The integration of other types of collateral assets (as equipment) that show a much wider diversity. As cited in [17] , "Rolling stocks register the highest recovery rates because leasing specialists benefit from a good understanding of secondary markets as they are well organized and homogeneous".
• Studying more consistently the explanatory power of each key variable on
LGDs.
Finally, the present study contributes to the enhancement of the public awareness on retail financing risk and the effective mitigation provided by physical collateral thanks to a proprietary database. Given the results, showing evidence on these data could only undoubtedly benefit leasing companies as a whole when discussing with the Basle regulatory body.
